In 1993, the parasite cryptosporidium infested the Milwaukee-area drinking supply and sickened some 400,000 people. This study uses survey data gathered from 610 residents in the wake of that outbreak to look at predictors of the complexity of people ' In 1993, Milwaukee faced the nation's largest outbreak of waterborne disease on record. The protozoan cryptosporidium got into the city's drinking water and caused diarrheal illness in nearly 40 percent of Milwaukee-area residents, according to a state-funded survey. Although cryptosporidium had been relatively unknown to the general public, Milwaukee residents were deluged with information from the mass media ranging from speculation about who was to blame for the outbreak to recommendations about how to minimize individual exposure. A few months after the outbreak, a survey of 610 Milwaukee residents sought information about factors that might influence residents' use of various communication channels for information about this hazard. The data contained in that survey offered insight into how people's media use and their experience with cryptosporidiosis, the illness caused by the parasite, may relate to their understanding of the factors that contributed to the outbreak, the likelihood that such an outbreak could occur again, and the ways in which illness could be avoided if another outbreak did occur.
theory of mental models (Gentner and Stevens 1983; Halford 1993; JohnsonLaird 1983 JohnsonLaird , 2001 Oakhill and Garnham 1996) , and parallel distributed processing and connectionism McClelland, Rumelhart, and Hinton 1986; McCloskey 1991; Quinlan 1991; Rumelhart, Hinton, and McClelland 1986; Shanks 1991) .
Most of these theories conceptualize knowledge as structured and organized hierarchically and thematically. Notable differences among these theories concern the way in which themes are created and used to interpret incoming stimuli or the way in which stored information is activated once stimuli enter consciousness. In this current study, we were primarily interested in how stored information is organized, rather than how it is put into use. Therefore, we turned our attention to the more general schema theory. Schemas are topic-specific "knowledge structures that express the basic properties of objects and sequences of events" (Haberlandt 1997, 143) . Zajonc (1960) , who applied the principles of schema theory to the study of interpersonal communication, conceptualized schematic structures as consisting of four dimensions: differentiation, which captures the breadth of knowledge within the structure; complexity, which captures the depth of knowledge within the structure in terms of groupings and subgroupings; unity, which captures the cohesiveness of information within the structure; and organization, which captures whether information within the structure is guided by a single theme. The more differentiated, complex, unified, and organized the schematic structure, the more complex the individual's knowledge domain.
When dealing with complex information, individuals need more than just kernels of information or miscellaneous facts to move beyond a cursory understanding; they need a means of tying together the bits of information and of structuring knowledge so that it is meaningful and readily accessible in memory. A complex knowledge domain serves this purpose. Therefore, as Genova and Greenberg (1979) asserted, it is the extent to which information is organized in an individual's cognitive system that allows researchers to distinguish mere "acquaintance with" from actually "knowing about" a given subject. Genova and Greenberg used the terms "factual knowledge" and "structural knowledge" to distinguish between these two types of knowing, respectively (1979, (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) .
Knowledge Complexity: Experts and Novices
The concepts of acquaintance with and knowledge about can perhaps be better understood if one contrasts the novice with the expert. In their textbook on cognitive psychology, Medin and Ross (1997) wrote that novices are individuals who are relatively unfamiliar with a given knowledge domain, while experts are individuals who have experience with and understanding of a domain. The same individual can be an expert in one domain and a novice in another.
When novices encounter complex information, Medin and Ross (1997) explained, they are faced with the difficulty of knowing how to apply their existing knowledge to the situation. In addition, they must rely on surface, or obvious, features of the problem, which inhibits their ability to move much beyond a cursory understanding. Novices also are more likely than experts to make mistakes by calling up inappropriate knowledge from memory. According to Fiske, Kinder, and Larter (1983) , novices make these errors because they are inhibited by the limitations of short-term memory. Because of their lack of experience, novices cannot rely on long-term memory to provide them with a structure for incoming information. Therefore, they are forced to use short-term memory for initial information storage as well as for a workspace in which they can tie the bits of information together in some meaningful way. As a result, novices are likely to create a fragmented and perhaps even inaccurate understanding of the incoming information.
Experts can overcome these obstacles via the use of knowledge that they have built up in long-term memory through experience. The knowledge they have built throughout time, according to Medin and Ross (1997) , contains more than fragments of surface information; it contains the units of structured or organized knowledge that are the products of deeper understanding and elaboration. Experts can use this structure to guide their processing, and, as a result, can detect relevant information in their environment quickly and efficiently. This means that, unlike novices, experts are not as inhibited by short-term memory constraints. Therefore, experts are less likely to come away from new information with the inaccurate understanding that can result from strained resources.
This distinction between experts and novices can be a useful one for mass communication scholars interested in looking more closely at the quantity and quality of an individual's topic-specific knowledge. It is a simple dichotomy, but it allows for an exploration of the basic parameters of topic-specific knowledge. In this current study, however, we offer this distinction only for illustrative purposes as a means for highlighting the desirability and functionality of a more complex knowledge base. In this study, we are conceptualizing knowledge complexity as more flexible and organic 2 (rather than dichotomous).
Knowledge Complexity: Causal Explanations
For an individual to understand much of the natural phenomena she encounters in her lifetime, she must hone her ability to understand causal processes. Understanding a causal process can be as simple as knowing how a contagious illness is spread or why recycling aluminum is important. Based at least in part on the sources of our information, background knowledge on the topic, and information-handling skills, our understanding can range anywhere from very simple (novice) to very complex (expert). Bass and Maddux (1982) used causal explanations in their research on scientific explanations and reasoning. They were interested in gaining a better understanding of the skill level needed by an individual to make sense of a causal process. The researchers were interested in whether individuals who lack formal reasoning skills would have trouble remembering complex causal explanations of natural phenomena discussed in a science lesson. They presented high school and college students with several explanations of the relationships among gases, air, and heat. The researchers found that, although simple explanations were easily recalled by individuals who lacked formal reasoning abilities, complex causal explanations proved significantly more difficult.
The importance of structural knowledge (expertise) was made clear in their findings. Bass and Maddux suggested that, when teaching complex causal explanations to students who lack formal reasoning skills, it may be beneficial to supply these students with some "external structuring" to enable them to link "various propositions of the explanation to one another" (1982, 533) . This conclusion need not be limited to individuals lacking in formal reasoning skills; rather, based on the research of Genova and Greenberg (1979) , it is likely to apply to any individual who lacks "expertise" in a given knowledge domain. Without a structure, unfamiliar information most likely will remain fragmented and not integrated with existing knowledge.
Factors Influencing Knowledge Acquisition
Understanding individual differences in knowledge is not simply a matter of categorizing individuals as experts or novices in a given domain. It also involves looking at the various factors that may contribute to the building of knowledge within that domain. Experience and motivation are two such factors. Doll and Ajzen (1992) asserted that individuals who have direct experience with a particular issue are more motivated to assimilate complex information than individuals who do not have experience with it. In addition, Ajzen and Sexton (1999) suggested that involvement with or interest in an issue will also increase motivation to attend to and process information about that issue; such motivation is likely to increase the complexity of a person's cognitions about the issue.
Another factor that contributes to knowledge building within a domain (and one that may also influence-and be influenced by-motivation and experience) is socioeconomic status and the concomitant availability of information (Ettema and Kline 1977; Griffin 1990; Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien 1970) . In 1970, Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien introduced the knowledge gap hypothesis, which asserted that as the infusion of mass media information into a social system increases, segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments, so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to increase. (P. 159) Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien (1970) attribute this knowledge differential in part to the availability of resources such as reading and comprehension skills, existing background knowledge, and relevant social contacts. They also attribute information availability to "the nature of the mass media system that delivers information" (p. 162). For example, they argue that traditional print media in the United States are geared to the "interests and tastes" of higher status segments of society (p. 162). That may contribute to that segment's heavier use of newspapers, which are a primary source of science and public affairs information for higher status persons (Ettema and Kline 1977; Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien 1970) .
Knowledge gaps have indeed been revealed by many studies. Since 1970, more than seventy empirical studies, commentaries, and critiques have been published in support of the knowledge gap concept (Viswanath and Finnegan 1995) . Early knowledge gap studies located gaps regarding such topics as public affairs, science, and health (Viswanath and Finnegan 1995) . Enough contradictory research surfaced in the early days (e.g., gaps did not necessarily widen), however, that Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien revised the hypothesis in 1975 to include mediating factors in addition to socioeconomic status. These mediators included local community impact, conflict, social structure, and flow of topical information within the social system. Ettema and Kline (1977) further refined the hypotheses to account for group differences in motivation and the possibility that much mass-mediated information is perceived as irrelevant by audiences in the lower socioeconomic groups. Ettema and Kline (1977) also posited the existence of a "ceiling effect" in the knowledge acquisition of audiences in the higher socioeconomic group such that audiences from lower groups could eventually "catch up."
The studies that followed these reformulations found public affairs knowledge gaps not only between audiences in lower and higher socioeconomic groups, but also between audiences with differing topical interests. In their review of the literature, Viswanath and Finnegan (1995) also noted that some studies showed knowledge acquisition differences between audiences with and without topical knowledge. These findings confirm the role of experience and motivation as contributing factors in the acquisition of knowledge (for another discussion of the significance of motivation in the relationship between education and knowledge gaps, see Kwak 1999) .
Education is an important mediating variable, knowledge gap researchers contend, because when less educated individuals do read the print media, they may lack the analytical skills needed to tackle more complex topics. Those skills include training in public affairs or civics, the ability to evaluate different types of evidence, and access to additional information (Griffin 1990 ). Viswanath and Finnegan (1995) explained, "Higher formal education provides a 'trained capacity' to follow certain issues, to relate these to other similar events and causes, and to better comprehend their significance" (p. 200).
Katzman (1974) also emphasized differences in formal education and access to new communication technology, both of which are rooted in available economic resources, as contributing variables to knowledge acquisition. It is also likely that differential availability can affect one's literal ability to purchase or otherwise gain access to an information channel. Gathering a lot of information may, in many cases, simply be beyond the capabilities of someone's pocketbook.
Throughout the years, the knowledge gap literature has established a handful of independent variables-socioeconomic status, information availability, and education are among the more common ones-as important influencers of knowledge acquisition. This cross-sectional study will use some of the more robust knowledge gap predictors to examine their effect on knowledge complexity.
Media Politicization of Novel Topics
Because the news media are recognized as ubiquitous and important information resources, it is useful to consider the possible relationship between the ways in which the media present information and knowledge complexity.
According to Bass and Maddux (1982) , when individuals who lack formal reasoning skills or expertise in a given knowledge domain encounter new information, they may profit from a structure that assists them in assimilating that information. That is, information presented in a structured manner may allow the receiver to process new information more quickly and, as a result, more efficiently. Structure allows the receiver to make connections between pieces of knowledge so that the end result is an organized, meaningful, and, perhaps, more complex understanding.
Like all storytelling enterprises, the media make overt efforts to frame information through story narratives. Numerous scholars have emphasized the homogeneity and ubiquity of patterns of journalistic story framing across time and media (see Rachlin 1988; van Dijk 1988) , and others have described a variety of textual levels within any given story in which interpretive frameworks can be detected (Pan and Kosicki 1993) . Tying these frameworks to audience interpretations has been more difficult; some experiments have, however, offered persuasive evidence that people do seem to internalize text frames under some circumstances (see, for example, Iyengar 1991). This is particularly relevant when an audience lacks an alternate framework, which tends to be the case with novel news topics.
When a widespread parasitic outbreak occurred in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1993, individuals were suddenly bombarded with information about a topic that the majority of them had never encountered. Many people lacked context for the information they were suddenly receiving. Thus, the Milwaukee media were faced with the challenge of informing their novice public without overwhelming their processing capabilities.
The default interpretive framework for any novel story in the media, argue researchers, is political. That is, journalists will be more likely to give meaning to novel information by talking to legitimized actors in the public policy arena and then framing that information in ways that reflect the actions or opinions of policy makers (see, for example, Powell and Self 2003) .
For example, Griffin and Dunwoody (1997) , in a study of newspaper coverage of environmental risks, found that a political/governmental frame was by far the most common interpretive choice. Likewise, Lacy and Coulson (2000) found that newspapers tend to rely heavily on government sources when covering the environment (see also Sibbison 1988) . Political frames also have turned up in coverage of health topics; in an analysis of AIDS stories from the early to mid-1980s, Albert (1986) found that initial coverage emphasized such themes as deviancy, blame, and punishment, all of which signal some degree of politicization of the illness.
In the wake of the 1993 cryptosporidium outbreak, therefore, it is possible that media coverage would have emphasized the political dimensions of that novel issue. The anecdotal experience of the researchers, two of whom lived in Milwaukee at the time, was that much of the coverage immediately following the outbreak dealt with the responsiveness and responsibility of government agencies.
A political interpretation of the outbreak would have led media to emphasize some types of cryptosporidium knowledge over others. Specifically, we expect that local reporters were far more comfortable tracking such political dimensions as "how the parasite got into the drinking water" and "who's at fault" rather than physiological/biological dimensions such as "What is the parasite?" and "What does it do inside the body to cause illness?"
Hypotheses
We were interested in predicting the complexity of individuals' knowledge regarding the 1993 cryptosporidiosis outbreak in Milwaukee. We were specifically interested in what people knew about (1) where the parasite came from and how it got into the water supply, and (2) what the parasite does to the human body to cause illness. In effect, we were interested in predicting the complexity of two specific causal explanations.
The knowledge gap literature asserts that individuals of higher socioeconomic status have more access to information and to the analytical skills needed to process it; therefore, we focused our first hypotheses on how socioeconomic status (as defined by income and education) may influence the complexity of these two causal explanations. We hypothesized the following: H1: Socioeconomic status (SES) will be a statistically significant predictor of the complexity of both explanations-how cryptosporidium got into the Milwaukee water supply and what the parasite does to the body to cause illness.
We were also interested in how motivation may serve as a catalyst for information processing. According to Doll and Ajzen (1992) and Ajzen and Sexton (1999) , direct experience and involvement or interest in an issue can be significant motivators. Our next hypothesis, therefore, is the following:
H2: Motivation-defined by worry, perceived likelihood of coming to harm in the future, and personal experience-will be a statistically significant predictor of complexity of both causal explanations.
Finally, we sought to better understand how media exposure may have influenced the respondents'explanations. Much of the coverage immediately after the outbreak dealt with the responsiveness and responsibility of govern-ment agencies. There was much discourse about who was to blame, with a sizable portion of the media focus falling on the municipal water plants' failure to filter out the contamination. If the media indeed framed this crisis as predominantly a "political" one, then the media likely paid more attention to how cryptosporidium got into the water supply than to how the parasite interacted with the human body to make people ill. Thus, our last two hypotheses predicted the following:
H3: Individuals' causal explanations for how cryptosporidium got into the Milwaukee water supply will be more complex than explanations for what it does to the human body. H4: Respondents' reported use of the mass media for information about the cryptosporidium outbreak will be a significant predictor of the explanatory complexity of how cryptosporidium got into the Milwaukee water supply, but not of the complexity of explanations for what the parasite does to the human body.
Method
A professional research firm conducted a telephone survey of 610 adult residents who lived in the area served by the Milwaukee water works in 1993, approximately three months after the outbreak occurred. The survey explored risks stemming from lead in drinking water and from cryptosporidium contamination. Data from the latter are the focus of this report.
Sampling and Data Gathering
Residences were sampled by random digit dialing, and adult respondents were randomly chosen within households. Interviews took about twenty-five minutes to complete and were conducted in the summer and early fall of 1993. The response rate was 53 percent of eligible respondents. To validate the survey, we compared demographic information from the sample with census data for the same area. Although the sample tends to slightly overrepresent people with higher education levels, sample data otherwise closely parallel the known population demographics of Milwaukee within sampling error.
Data were gathered in five broad categories for this analysis: (1) social structural variables; (2) media exposure and attention to stories about cryptosporidium; (3) risk experience, worry about risk, and perceived likelihood of future risk; (4) an open-ended question soliciting an explanation of where cryptosporidium came from and how it got into the Milwaukee water supply; and (5) an open-ended question soliciting an explanation of what crypto-sporidium does to the human body. Other demographic variables (e.g., gender) were included in the analyses as control variables to account for more variance and create a more realistic picture of how other variables were performing.
Social Structural Variables
Interviewers gathered information about the respondent's sex, age, race, education, and annual household income. Although education and income were moderately correlated (r = .40, p < .001), combining the two variables into a single socioeconomic index produced a low alpha (.56). As a result, we used each of the demographic variables as an independent item and tested each individually as a predictor of knowledge complexity.
Motivation
We obtained measures of whether a respondent actually got sick from exposure to cryptosporidiosis as well as judgments of how likely she or he was to get sick in the future and how worried she or he was about that possible scenario. Our three motivation variables-experience with the parasite, worry about the parasite, and perceived likelihood of experiencing it in the future-were collapsed into two variables. Because worry and perceived likelihood were strongly correlated (r = .63, p <.001), we created an index from those two variables (alpha = .77). Experience was only weakly correlated with the other two variables; therefore, it was used independently.
Media Use and Attention
We used two predictors of media politicization of novel topics: respondents' reported level of media use and their reported attention to cryptosporidium stories in various channels. Respondents were asked to indicate, on average, how many days a week they use various news media. Of particular interest to us were radio news, television news, and newspapers. Our intention was to create factor scores to allow for an index of general media exposure. Preliminary examination of the data revealed, however, that the three channels did not aggregate reliably. So these variables also were used as single items in the analysis.
Respondents also indicated the amount of attention they would allocate to stories about cryptosporidium if they encountered such stories in the mass media. Again, we were interested in radio news, television news, and newspapers. Using factor scores, we built an index of attention to cryptosporidium news. The three channels did aggregate reliably for this dimension; the alpha for this index was .82.
Knowledge Complexity
We were determined to develop a methodology for measuring knowledge complexity using ordinal rather than nominal values. We did not want to dichotomize individuals as either experts or novices; we were interested in something less value laden and more quantifiable. Based on the literature reviewed above, we determined two key factors that would allow for quantification but also allow us to capture more than one dimension of knowledge complexity. These factors were (1) the quantity of isolable units of knowledge present in a causal explanation and (2) the degree to which these units are connected.
The measurement of knowledge complexity has a rich history. Once we knew the properties we were interested in, we combed the literature for appropriate methodologies. One of the most cited articles we encountered on this topic was published by Zajonc in 1960. Zajonc was interested in the cognitive structures activated when people convey to others characteristics that they have assigned to an object or event. To capture these structures (differentiation, complexity, unity, and organization), he asked participants to read a letter from one fictitious person to another; they were then asked to write down the characteristics of the letter writer, which they believed would be shared with another party.
This methodology captured the quantity and connectedness of the knowledge that we were interested in measuring; it was, however, intended to work with grocery list-style re-creations of characteristics. Zajonc (1960) asked respondents to literally "list" isolable attributes. This type of measurement was too artificial for our purposes. Our respondents were surveyed in a more natural setting, and their responses resembled conversational explanations more than lists.
We next turned to the work of Crockett (1965) . Like Zajonc, Crockett was interested in how individuals construct impressions of others. His methodology was very similar to that of Zajonc (1960) , which meant that it did not translate well for our purposes. He introduced a term, however, that he called "constructs" to refer to the characteristic descriptors used by his respondents; Zajonc used a similar term, which he labeled "attributes." We preferred the term construct because it captured the constructivist 3 approach that we were taking to quantify knowledge. This was a term that we kept in mind as we continued to search for a way to measure what we had now come to realize were more like constructed explanations or narratives than itemized lists.
We turned next to the work of Bass and Maddux (1982) . Like us, Bass and Maddux were interested in the study of explanations, in this case, scientific explanations. To capture the isolable units of knowledge within the explanations, they used a concept that they labeled "implications." Implications were cause-and-effect statements, such as "if P, then Q." These were statements that linked causes and effects by using such words as if . . then, and, because, and so.
Although Bass and Maddux's (1982) scientific explanations most closely resembled the causal explanations that we sought, the methodological fit was not exact because it was unrealistic for us to expect our respondents to use structured implication statements to explain how they thought about risk. Thus, we modified our measurement scheme to fit the less structured nature of the explanations that we sought to quantify. Similar to Crockett (1965) , we decided to search our explanations for something we called contributing constructs. That is, we located within the explanations words or strings of words that acted as contributing factors in the respondents' causal explanations. By isolating only the contributing constructs, we were taking precautions to ensure that we did not erroneously capture words or constructs that did not contribute to the overall explanations that we sought to quantify.
To cull these contributing constructs from the larger text, we searched the text for clues that indicated when one construct ended and the next began. Such clues included conjoining words, such as and, when used to connect independent clauses; punctuation, such as periods, dashes, and commas, when used to separate independent clauses; and external probes by the interviewer that resulted in additional comments. "I don't know" and other admissions of ignorance were not coded, nor were repetitive phrasings.
Consider the following response transcribed from a respondent asked for an explanation for how cryptosporidium got into the Milwaukee water supply:
I figure it came from the sewers. The sewers clog up and that gets into the water system. If they had a better sewage system, we wouldn't have that trouble. Our coding scheme isolated six contributing constructs:
1. I figure it came from the sewers. 2. The sewers clog up 3. and that gets into the water system. 4. If they had a better sewage system, we wouldn't have that trouble. [Interviewer probe: What else. . . ?] 5. I heard of a dead cow from the Peck meat-packing company-6. I also heard somebody dumped something into the water.
Each contributing construct added a point to an individual's explanatory complexity score. Because, however, isolated facts are not as valuable as structured information, we also assessed the connectedness of these factors by searching the responses for evidence of conceptual relatedness between adjacent factors. This was similar to the approaches used by Crockett (1965) and Zajonc (1960) to assess the interrelatedness of constructs or attributes. 4 In our coding scheme, conceptual relatedness referred to the sharing of substantive terms across factors or to an overt causal linkage such as the causeand-effect implications used by Bass and Maddux (1982) . Each linkage also added a point to an individual's complexity score.
In the above example:
1. Factors 1 and 2 are conceptually linked-both refer to the sewers. Total explanatory complexity scores were calculated by summing the number of contributing factors and the number of linkages within an explanation. In the above example, this score was 10 (6 factors and 4 linkages). This additive index gives equal weight to both dimensions of complexity, because existing complexity measures do not offer compelling reasons to privilege one component over the other.
This coding scheme does not take into account whether the responses were correct or based in fact. In an earlier study of these same open-ended comments, acceptable reliability was not achievable; the coders had an extremely difficult time determining accuracy.
Two coders conducted a reliability test, taking chance into account. Krippendorff's alpha was 1.0 for the contributing factors and .89 for linkages (Krippendorff 1980) . Overall, total complexity scores for explanations of how cryptosporidium got into the water supply ranged from 0 to 16; the mean score was 5, and about 7 percent of the sample received a score of 0 because they did not offer a response. Total complexity scores for explanations of what the parasite did to the human body to cause illness ranged from 0 to 13; the mean score was 4, and about 13 percent of the sample received a score of 0 because they did not offer a response.
Results
Within our sample, ages ranged from eighteen to ninety-two, with a mean age of forty-four. Fifty-eight percent of the sample was female. The typical respondent had taken at least some courses beyond high school and reported an average household income of $20,000 to $30,000. About 17 percent of the sample indicated their ethnicity as other than white. About 39 percent of the sample reported previous experience with cryptosporidiosis. These demographics closely resemble those of all Milwaukee residents.
Analyses
We first created a bivariate Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for all the variables in the analyses. These correlations are contained in Table 1 and offer a look at preliminary bivariate relationships. In addition to the relationship between education and income (r = .40, p < .001), another notable relationship was between (and this comes as no surprise to mass media researchers) age and exposure to newspapers (r = .36, p < .001). Moderate relationships were also found between worry/likelihood and having gotten sick (r = .32, p < .001) and between worry/likelihood and attention to cryptosporidium stories in the media (r = .37, p < .001). Also notable is the moderate correlation between answers to the two knowledge questions (r = .34, p < .001).
Next, we tested the bulk of our hypotheses via regression analyses. Four hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted. We sought to keep the two different measures of media use-exposure and attention-separate because they are treated in the communication literature as conceptually distinct. So, for each of the two measures of explanatory complexity (how cryptosporidium got into the water supply and what it does to the body), we offer two regressions: one featuring media exposure as three separate variables (Table 2 ) and the other featuring attention to cryptosporidium stories as one aggregate variable ( Table 3 ). The other independent variables otherwise remained the same. Finally, to test H3, which hypothesized an effect of the political frames of media stories, we used a paired-sample t test.
In our regression analyses, standardized regression coefficients (betas) were used as indicators of the relative importance of variables because not all variables were measured in comparable units. A probability level of p < .05 was used as the base level of statistical significance. The margin of error for percentages based on the entire sample in this report (95 percent level of confidence) is plus or minus 4 percent.
Socioeconomic Status
H1 asserted that SES would predict complexity of both the causal explanation of where cryptosporidium came from and how it got into the water supply, and the explanation of what it does to the body.
The correlations in Table 1 offer some preliminary information about the relationships among education and the other variables in this analysis. As previously mentioned, education and income are moderately correlated (r = Kahlor et al. / PREDICTING KNOWLEDGE COMPLEXITY 21 .06*** .06*** a. Gender was coded as male = 1 and female = 2. b. Race was coded as white = 1 and nonwhite = 2. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
.40, p < .001). In addition, education has a moderate to weak negative correlation with age (r = -.25, p < .001) and with exposure to television news (r = -.20, p < .001). It is weakly and negatively correlated with worry/likelihood (r = -.15, p < .001) and positively correlated with exposure to radio news (r = .14, p = .001). Most relevant to this hypothesis, however, is education's relationship to the two dependent variables in our analyses, the causal explanations. As indicated in Table 1 , education was weakly but significantly related to both explanations. As the multiple regressions in Tables 2 and 3 show, however, once other variables were added into the equation, H1 was only partially supported. Regardless of which media variable (general exposure versus attention to cryptosporidium news) was entered into the equation, education was related to causal explanations of what cryptosporidium does to the body (beta = .17, p < .001 for media exposure; beta = .15, p < .01 for attention to cryptosporidium news) but not to explanations of how it got into the water supply.
The correlations in Table 1 also offer some preliminary information about the relationships between income and the other variables in this analysis. In addition to its correlation with education, income is negatively correlated 22 SCIENCE COMMUNICATION with age (r = -.17, p < .001), gender (r = -.17, p < .001), and race (r = -.10, p < .05). It is also related to worry/likelihood (r = -.13, p < .01), as well as exposure to radio news (r = .18, p < .001), newspapers (r =.12, p < .01), and television news (r = -.10, p < .05).
As indicated in Table 1 , education was also weakly but significantly related to both causal explanations. Once one controls for the other variables, however, H2 was only partially supported (Tables 2 and 3 ). Regardless of which media variable (general exposure versus attention to cryptosporidium news) was entered into the equation, income survived as a significant predictor of explanations for how cryptosporidium got into the water supply (beta = .12, p < .05 for media exposure; beta = .11, p < .05 for attention to news) but not explanations for what it does to the body to cause illness.
Motivation
Motivation was represented by two variables: worry/likelihood and experience with cryptosporidium. The correlations in Table 1 show us that in addition to education and income, worry/likelihood was positively correlated with gender (r = .19, p < .001), race (r = .13, p < .01), and television news (r = .15, p < .001). Stronger positive correlations were found with attention to cryptosporidium news (r = .37, p < .001) and the other motivation variable, experience with cryptosporidium (r = .32, p < .001). Worry/likelihood was also positively related to causal explanations of what it does to the body (r = .11, p < .01).
Experience with cryptosporidium was also negatively related to age (r = -.10, p < .05) and positively related to attention to cryptosporidium news (r = .23, p < .001), exposure to radio news (r = .09, p < .05), and both causal explanations (r = .13, p = .001 for both).
H2 asserted that motivation-defined by worry and perceived likelihood, and experience-would predict to the complexity of both the causal explanation of where cryptosporidium came from and how it got into the Milwaukee water supply, and the explanation of what the parasite does to the body. As Tables 2 and 3 indicate, this hypothesis was partially supported.
When exposure was our media variable of choice (Table 2) , experience served as a weak but significant predictor of the complexity of both explanations (beta = .09, p < .05 in both cases). Worry/likelihood, on the other hand, was only a significant predictor of explanations of what it does to the body (beta = .12, p = .01).
When attention to cryptosporidium news was the media variable entered into the regressions (Table 3) , worry/likelihood was the only motivation variable of significance, and it predicted only to explanations of what crypto-sporidium does to the body (beta = .11, p < .05). Experience with the parasite did not contribute significantly to either of the explanations.
Media Politicization of Novel Topics
H3 predicted that causal explanations of how cryptosporidium got into the Milwaukee water supply would be more complex than explanations for what it does to the human body. To test this hypothesis, we performed a t test, which indicated that the hypothesis was supported (t = 9.13, n = 609, p < .001). Although the explanations are correlated (r = .34, p < .001), the complexity of respondents' reflections on how the parasite got into their water supply was greater than the complexity of their explanations of what the parasite does to the human body. The mean scores were 5 and 4, respectively.
H4 asserted that media use would predict to causal explanations for how cryptosporidium got into the Milwaukee water supply but not to the complexity of explanations for what it does to the human body. Our media-use variables were general exposure to radio news, television news, and newspapers, and attention to news about cryptosporidium specifically.
As indicated in Tables 2 and 3 , this hypothesis was not supported in either of our multiple regression analyses. One interesting relationship did emerge, however, in our correlation matrix (Table 1) between cryptosporidium news and explanations of what cryptosporidium does to the body to cause illness (r = .13, p < .01, the opposite of what one would expect).
Conclusions
In this study, we used four conceptual domains-knowledge complexity, socioeconomic status, motivation, and framing (i.e., the media politicization of novel topics)-to try to understand the complexity of individuals' understanding of a cryptosporidium outbreak in Milwaukee and the extent to which that complexity was linked to media use. Our goal was to explore factors that may influence the depth of people's understanding of the chain of events that led to this widespread threat to public health. The literature on the knowledge gap hypothesis that dealt specifically with socioeconomic status and the concomitant availability of resources proved useful, as did the literature on motivation and knowledge complexity. Our attempts to link media use to the explanations were not, however, as fruitful.
We had expected socioeconomic factors to be related to the complexity of a person's understanding of both the politically oriented (e.g., how cryptosporidium got into the water supply) and biological (e.g., what crypto-sporidium does to the body to cause illness) dimensions of the outbreak. Instead, we found that level of education was a significant predictor of biological knowledge complexity but not of political knowledge complexity, while level of income was a significant predictor of political knowledge complexity but not biological knowledge complexity.
Although an explanation for this difference cannot be gleaned from the data, one possibility is that one's ability to develop more complex understandings of these two domains-politics and biology-depends on different factors. A more sophisticated understanding of biological mechanisms may depend less on the availability of information in society than on formal education, which may nurture the ability to analyze such information. Political/ policy understanding, on the other hand, may be easier for less educated individuals to achieve but may depend on the "richness" of their information environment, a factor that knowledge gap researchers argue is at least partly a function of resources (income, in this study).
Perhaps the less surprising of the two relationships was that between education and knowledge about what cryptosporidium does to the body to cause illness. Aside from pubic affairs, science is generally considered to be among the knowledge domains most affected by socioeconomic disparities (see, for example, Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien 1975; Ettema and Kline 1977; Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien 1970) . And, as Viswanath and Finnegan (1995) explained, it is likely that level of education is the socioeconomic variable most likely to provide the "trained capacity" that enables individuals to follow certain issues, to relate those issues to similar events and causes, and to better comprehend their significance (200). A complex understanding of what a parasite does to the human body to cause illness requires at least a basic understanding of science-in this case, human biology, etiology, and parasitic organisms-and some degree of training that can enable people to relate any new information to their existing knowledge. Studies of science literacy typically isolate education as the main predictor of science knowledge (National Science Board 2002).
Why education did not relate significantly to knowledge about where cryptosporidium came from and how it got into the water supply is more difficult to understand. A complex understanding of the policy dimensions of the cryptosporidium crisis would presumably have required similar skills: a basic understanding of science and (in this case) public affairs or public works, and some degree of training that can enable someone to relate new information to his or her existing knowledge. But it was not education that made a difference here; rather, it was income that seemed to influence one's ability to offer a complex causal explanation about this process.
As noted above, one possibility is that the ubiquity of political/policy explanations of social phenomena in our culture puts all Americans on a potentially more equitable playing field when handling political topics. Given a need to know-a motivation likely in a health crisis such as the cryptosporidium outbreak-individuals at all socioeconomic levels may seek information. Knowledge complexity differences in such circumstances may be less a function of education than of ability to access channels with relevant information. Access, thus, may be related to income.
Our findings on motivation also were consistent with the literature on cognitive complexity, which indicates that experience and involvement with a topic tend to encourage people to seek out and process information about that topic (Ajzen and Sexton 1999; Doll and Ajzen 1992) . In two of our four regressions (see Table 1 ), experience with cryptosporidium did survive as a predictor of explanatory complexity for both how the parasite got into the water supply and what it does to the body to cause illness.
Experience with this particular topic meant having suffered such symptoms as persistent diarrhea, vomiting, painful abdominal cramping, and dehydration. In the case of cryptosporidiosis, a relatively unknown illness to the general public, individuals who suffered these symptoms most likely had a strong interest in gaining information about what was going on in their bodies and how this outbreak came about in the first place.
Our other motivation variable, worry/likelihood, predicted explanatory complexity only with respect to explanations about what the parasite does to the body to cause illness. In this study, at least, estimated level of risk and worry about getting sick were not related to knowledge about external factors, such as how a hazardous event came to pass or who was to blame. On the other hand, perceived personal risk and worry were related to knowledge about one specific internal factor-how the parasite affects one's own body. In fact, we suspect that this particular factor is likely to be the very object of an individual's concern about the risk: How does it affect me? Interestingly, when attention to news about cryptosporidium replaced media exposure in the regressions, neither of our motivation variables was related to explanations about how cryptosporidium got into the water supply. This outcome may reflect the ubiquity of news coverage about how the parasite infiltrated the water supply. Perhaps even individuals who had little or no motivation to seek information about the outbreak (and those individuals likely would have been rare) could not avoid hearing about how the parasite got into the water. Under such circumstances, motivation would not have been a necessary prerequisite to being informed.
We were also unable to establish that knowledge complexity was related to media use. The fact that people were better able to talk about how the parasite got into the water versus what it does to cause illness suggests, however, that even in an information-rich environment, the more ubiquitous information available may have been focused on this more politically oriented explanation.
Overall, our models accounted for modest variance in cognitive complexity. One possible contributor to this is that several of our independent measures exhibited low reliabilities, forcing us to use single-item predictors, which could have suppressed some relationships. Another explanation is that the way in which we captured cognitive complexity did not take into account whether the responses were accurate. It is possible that by accepting all answers, regardless of their veracity, the relationships between complexity and the other variables-particularly education-could have been suppressed. Future research may want to be more sensitive to these issues.
Although its predictors are elusive, knowledge complexity-or, more specifically, complexity of causal explanations-did prove to be a useful dependent variable when looking at individuals' understanding of the chain of events that led to this widespread threat to public health in Milwaukee. Future risk research that looks at knowledge complexity as a dependent variable might look more closely at other education-related variables, such as formal training in science and public affairs. According to knowledge gap research, other potential predictors may include risk-related community conflicts and beliefs about such conflicts, and potential language differences that may affect the manner in which knowledge is expressed (see, for example, Ettema and Kline 1977) .
Notes
and integration of multiple perspectives and dimensions (Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Streufert 1992) . Simple reasoning occurs when a single dimension (e.g., good-bad) is used to consider an issue. This approach is most useful when respondents are presented with complex social topics such as criminal punishment, homelessness, race relations, and so on.
